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Greater than another area, the metaphysics of memory reflects the trend in direction of interdisciplinarity noted above, and work in this area sometimes shades into philosophy of psychology (Rowlands 2009) and philosophy of neuroscience (Bickle 2011). Relevant work within the philosophy of psychology is discussed right here as applicable; for more specialised work within the philosophy of neuroscience, see the entry on that topic. The central intention of mainstream research on the metaphysics of memory is to develop a principle of remembering: a basic however informative account of what it's for somebody to recollect one thing. As we'll see, nevertheless, there are a number of kinds of memory. It is unclear whether or not it is possible to develop a principle of remembering that applies to all of these, and ultimately it might show essential to develop multiple theories of remembering, corresponding to the a number of kinds of memory. 2002), philosophers have singled episodic memory out for special attention on the bottom that it gives the rememberer with a unique form of entry to past occasions.
For some, indeed, only episodic memory actually deserves the title "Memory Wave Audio" (Klein 2015; B. Russell 1921). Reflecting this focus, this entry will be involved primarily with theories of episodic remembering: accounts of what it's for someone to recollect an event from his personal past. Due, perhaps, to their give attention to episodic memory, philosophers have usually approached memory as a capacity exercised by single people. 1994; cf. Barash 2016; Michaelian & Sutton forthcoming) and which has lately given birth to the multidisciplinary field of memory studies (Roediger & Wertsch 2008; Segesten & Wüstenberg forthcoming). It has additionally come to incorporate points arising from the more moderen tradition of research on external memory in cognitive science which views remembering through the lens of distributed (Hutchins 1995) or prolonged (Clark & Chalmers 1998) theories of cognition. Whereas the entry is concerned primarily with particular person memory, these newer issues will likely be mentioned as effectively.
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Before turning to theories of episodic remembering, it will be useful to situate episodic memory with respect to different sorts of Memory Wave. In its broadest sense, "memory" refers to the various outcomes of the diverse forms of studying of which people and different brokers are succesful. Any modification of an agent’s behavioural tendencies as a result of its experience thus doubtlessly counts as memory, making the category of memory very broad indeed. Despite the breadth of the category, however, there is an approximate consensus on a taxonomy of sorts of human memory. Philosophers usually distinguish amongst three essential kinds of memory. 1911) and Russell (1921), for example, distinguished between habit Memory Wave and recollective memory, while Broad (1925) and Furlong (1951) additional distinguished between recollective memory and propositional memory (cf. Ayer (1956; D. Locke 1971)). These distinctions align reasonably well with these drawn by a taxonomy which, originating in psychology, has increasingly grow to be commonplace in more recent philosophy.
The taxonomy in query, developed intimately by Squire (2009), divides the overarching class of memory into declarative and nondeclarative memory. Declarative memory, in flip, is divided into episodic memory, corresponding roughly to recollective memory, and semantic memory, corresponding roughly to propositional memory. A primary move at distinguishing episodic from semantic memory may be made by observing that the former is concerned with the occasions of one’s private past specifically (e.g., I remember speaking at a conference in Budapest), whereas the later is concerned with the world on the whole (I keep in mind that Budapest is the capital of Hungary). It is crucial to note, nevertheless, that semantic memory is also sometimes concerned with past events. One can have reminiscences that concern events that one didn't oneself experience (I do not forget that my colleague spoke at a workshop in Rome, although I didn't hear him converse); when one does, one remembers semantically, not episodically.